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RECOIsTSTKUCTION' 



UNION: 

SUGGESTIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH 

OX A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION. 

BY A CITIZEN OF IOWA. 



"The unity of Government which cocstilutes you one people » • • * is a main pillar In lie edifica 
of your real Inlupendence. 

" Ii Is of r.ifijiite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your National Uniou 
to your collective and inaividual happiuess ; tliat you should cherish a cordial, habitual and immovable 
ati.K-hment to it ; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as the palladium of your political safety 
a;id prosperity ; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety ; discountenancing whatever may 
BUigest even a suspicion that it can, in any event be abandoned ; and indignantly frowning upon the first 
dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties 
which now link the various parts." — Waf,hington''s Fareicell Address. 



NEW YORK: 7^ 

J. B I^_A.D B XJ RIST, 

(.Successor to 3f. Doolady,) 
49 WALKER STREET. 

1863. 



,^ 









JOHN J. REED, PEINTER, 
43 CENTKE-STBEET, NEW-YOEK. 



RECONSTRUCTIOIf OF THE UI^IOE 



There are occasions, in the convulsive events of nations, when 
it becomes an imperative obligation on tlie Immblest citizen, as 
well as it is the duty of the most exalted statesman, to become 
a voluntaiy mariner on the Sliip of State, and to do the part 
which becomes a patriot in that capacity, in preserving from 
destruction the Ark of the National Covenant. It is in this 
capacity, as a private volunteer, that the writer comes before 
liis fellow-citizens, and lays before them such considerations as 
may influence them to reflect upon the real condition of our 
cc>mmon country, and as may lead them to apply some effectual 
remedy to the evils which have affected it to such an extent as 
to have involved it in a fratricidal war, and which threatens its 
destruction as a nation and our ruin as a people. 

The writer has had some opportunities to know the sentiments, 
opinions, and feelings of the people of the South, both in relation 
to the inciting causes which influenced tliem to revolt against 
tlic Federal Government and their fellow-citizens of the North, 
and in respect to the terms on which they might again be 
induced or influenced to unite with the people of the North 
under one government. 

It is with some hope — a faint one, it is confessed, under exist- 
ing circumstances — that he might contribute ever so little to 
bruig about a reconstruction of the Union, and be the means, 
in ever so slight a degree, of perj^etuating the blessings of free 
government to posterity, that the writer presents these sugges- 
tions to the consideration of his fellow-citizens. They are the re- 



suit not only of his own observations of tlie working of the public 
mind, and of his reflections on the state of the country and our 
system of government, but what is of more importance to effect 
the object in view, these suggestions are a reflection of the 
Union sentiment of the South, and of tlie opinion and feelings 
of Southern men who still hope for a reunion of the States under 
one system of government. 

From the day on which the insurrection in the South took 
the form of Revolution and established a de facto government, 
which the people of the States that seceded formally from the 
Union regarded and obeyedcpis if it were their legitimate govern- 
ment, it ought to have been perceived by those who were 
entrusted with the administration of the Federal Government, 
that to restore tlie Union as it M^as, or to reconstruct it upon 
such a basis as might be permanent, the South should become 
not merely a party, but a voluntary party, to any new arrange- 
ment designed to effect that object. To all intents and purposes, 
the seceded States became, by their act of secession, and by 
their confederating together under a compact of their own, 
a new nation ; and it might and ought to have been foreseen, 
by the people of the States which remained, as it is called, loyal 
to the old Government, that in any attempt to restore them to 
the Union under the old compact, or in the endeavor to bring 
about a reconstruction on some new basis, the seceded States 
should be considered and treated, not as rebels, but as a people 
having as much the right to self-government as those who 
adhered to the old Government, or the people of any other 
nation. It is nothing to the purpose to allege that they were 
rebels. This may be admitted without invalidating their ab- 
stract right to self-government. They acted upon the presump- 
tion, which appeared to them to be well founded, that there was 
a hostility to them in the Northern mind, which manifested 
itself towards them, not only in the political, but, more griev- 
ously still, in their social relations. By a large portion, a decided 
majority, as the South thoitght — and as appears to have been 
the case — of the people of the ]N"orth, the South felt itself to be 
regarded as an unfit associate, politically and socially, with ita 
sectional neighbor. 



The doctrine of the "irrepressible coiiflict" was felt in the 
South to mean more than the political relations it pretended to 
change. The South regarded it as more formidable and repui;- 
nant to its rights, interests, and social condition than it appeared 
in its aspect to the North. To the South, it not only tln-eatened 
a change of the political relations which existed till then between 
the ISTorth and South, but it forbode such a change in the social 
system and domestic economy of eight millions of people as 
would, in their relations to the North, throw them back centu- 
ries in the scale of civilization and enlightenment, and place 
them in disparaging contrast with, if not in real subjection to, 
their more commercial neighbor. Hence the alarm of the 
South at the favor with which the popular mind of tlie North 
received the proposition that the States of the Union must bo 
all slave or all free. Had the Union of free and slave States 
been an untried experiment, there might have been room for 
doubt as to whether a people like the American, having such 
discordant elements among them, and such diversities of inter- 
ests to foster and protect, could be aggregated and live in har^ 
mony as one nation. But the experiment had been tried, and 
it was successful beyond anticipation. North and South had 
been benefitted by the Union ; both sections had prospered in 
the Union; each had contributed to the happiness and pros- 
perity of the other, and both together had, by their united 
eflorts, become, in one nation, the perfection as it seemed, of 
liuman government. "Was it not amazing, then, that when the 
experiment was proved to have been a success, of a people liv- 
ing so far apart geographically, yet united, and whose interests 
were so diverse in a pecuniary point of view, yet harmonized so 
as to ensure prosperity to both — that one of the parties to this 
compact, which resulted in this happy state of things, should, all 
of a sudden, seize, as it were, a firebrand and thrust it into the 
edifice which gave security, protection, repose, and happiness to 
both? In such a light did the South regard the annunciation of 
the dogma of the " irrepressible conflict ;" and when this dogma 
was incorporated in the so-called Personal Liberty Bills of North- 
ern State Legislatures, the forebodings of danger and the aj^pre- 
Lension of evil, with which the South was alarmed at the first 



6 

annunciation of this dogma, became a confirmed belief in the 
Soutb that it was the design of the Korth to subject the South 
to the moral, political, and social ideas and habits of the North, 
and to assimilate, malgre the laws of nature, the j)eople of the 
South with those of the N'orth in one system, socially, as they 
were one, to a great extent, politically. The South knew that 
such a design was not practicable, and that the attempt of the 
North to bring about such a state of things could end only in 
confusion, and if the North persisted in the endeavor to eifect 
it, in violence and civil war. Hence the statesmen, philoso- 
phers, and economists of the South, seeing, as they supposed, 
but one means by which the evils threatened them by the attempt 
to overthrow the laws of nature, and to change by force their 
social system, could be averted, resolved to have recourse to the 
remedy, and apply it at once, before the danger became nearer, 
more menacing, and difficult to overcome. 

As soon, therefore, as public sentiment in the North mani- 
fested itself favorably to the doctrine of the "irrepressible con- 
flict," by the election to the Presidency of on.e of the advocates 
of that doctrine, and the representative of all who professed it 
as their creed, the South felt that to save themselves their only 
way was to separate from those who had manifestly become 
their enemies persourlly, it appeared, as well as of their institu- 
tions. The excuse of the South for doing this so soon, and without 
waiting to know what relation the Federal Government imder 
Lincoln's Administration would hold towards them, is, that by 
remaining in the Union the Government would be so much the 
stronger and more powerful to carry into effect, in its relations 
towards the South, the doctrine and policy of the " irrepressible 
conflict." They took it for granted that an Executive who was 
chosen to administer the Government from the fact that he, as a 
private citizen, favored, if he did not originate, the docrine of the 
" irrepressible conflict," would, as a matter of course, carry out, 
in letter and spirit, the doctrines and policy of the party by 
whose votes he was made President. They therefore, instead of 
waiting till, as they say, it would be too late, made preparations 
to secure and protect themselves from aggression. 

Such was the xjosition of the far-seeing men of the South. A 



large portion, indeed a large majority, of tlie people of tliat sec- 
tion could not be brought to believe tlial it was the design or 
wish of the people of the iSTorth to interfere materially with the 
people of the South in their domestic rehitions, and they were 
therefore willing to give the new President a fair trial before 
proceeding to such extremities as to seize the forts, arms, and 
munitions of war located and deposited in the Southern States. 
This large portion of the people of the South became the more 
assured that President Lincoln would become the President of 
the whole people and not of the mere party by whose votes he 
was elected, from hearing what he had said on taking the oath 
of office, to support the Constitution of the United States. In 
his Inaugural Address, having, as he delivered it, the condition 
of the country in his mind, and influenced by the apprehensions 
of the Southern people of the evils which menaced them he 
said : 

" Apprehensions seem to exist among some of tlio people of the Southern 
States that by an accession of a Eepublican Administration, their property 
and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never 
been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample 
evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their 
inspection. It is found in nearly all the public speeches of him who now 
addre&ses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare 
that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution 
of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right 
to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." 

lie was right in his premises. Apprehensions did exist tliat 
the property and peace and personal security of the people of 
the South were endangered by the accession to power of a so- 
called Kepublican Executive. And had the President lived up 
in good faith to the declaration which he then made, and the 
solemn assurance which he then gave to the people of the South, 
that " he had no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with 
the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, and that 
he had no lawful right to do so," all would have been well; the 
insurrection would never have become the rebellion that it be- 
came subsequently ; the Union men of tlie South would have 
preserved the peace of the South despite the elforts of the 



8 

eeceders to excite a revolt. But, nnfortnnately, tlie Prc^iilont 
tlionght more of the dogmas of his party than he did of the 
Constitution of the United States. He \\'as influenced more by 
the suggestions of the partisans who sought his favor for sinister 
and party pui-poses than ho was by the advice and admonitions 
of patriotic men who, seeing the danger wliich menaced the 
country, besought him to save it by removing from the puiHc 
mind, as he could do, the apprehensions of coming evil. jS'ot 
only did he disregard his oath to preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution of the United States, but he acted in dire<-t 
conflict with his repeatedly dechired opinion that he had "no 
lawful right" to intei-fere witli slavery in the Slates in Avhieh it 
existed; and he violated his solemnly expressed assurance, 
if there be sohinnity in any assurance or declaration ever 
made by man, tliat lie had ''no intention" to interfere with 
slavery. 

It seems from rcnnt events that the secession party in the 
South had the proper appreciation of tlie President and of the 
party by whose votes he was elected. Tliey did not trust eitlier 
the President or his party from the first; and by degrees, tlio 
people of the South who had remained faithful to the old order 
of tilings, to the Union and the Constitution, and even to tlie 
Administration as the head of the government, became convinced 
that it was not so much to restore the Union as it was to carry 
into ]>ractical etiect against tlio Soutli the doctrine and policy of 
the '' IiTepressible Conliict," that the war was prosecuted by the 
Administration. For, thought the South, if the object were to 
restore the seceded States and revolted people of the Soutli to 
the Union, surely it is not by means of devastating, desolating 
and barbarous war the Administration would try to eftect that 
object. If, indeed, it were a mere insurrection which had l)roken 
out in the South, and not as it appeared to have become soon 
after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln in the presidency, a revolu- 
tion, it might have been suppressed by the power of the Govern- 
ment. But as it became a revolution involving a majority of the 
people of the seceded states in the revolt, and by degrees nearly 
the whole population of these states, it became a]>parent both to 
the South and to a large portion of the people of tlie Korth that 



9 

it vras not by force of arms, confiscation, rapine and ontraires to 
non-combatants, but by negotiation that a restoration of the 
South to the Union could be eflected, or tailing in that object, 
that a reconstruction of the Union on some new basis could be 
arranged. 

After it became apparent, as it did to the Administration soon 
after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, that the South contem- 
plated seceding from the Union, the duty of the Administration 
and of the party Avhich had obtained control of the government 
was to have removed the apprehensions of the South, and to 
have given it such assurances, and if necessary to put the South 
entirely at its ease, to give guarantees, that the Constitutional 
rights of the Southern people would be both respected and se- 
cured, and if need be, protected, by the whole power of the Fe- 
deral Government. Ko such assurance was given. Ko such 
guarantees were offered. On the contrary, the South was ex- 
pected to place its confidence in the party which embodied in 
Its organization every element in the Northern States hostile to 
the people of the South. This was too much for the ]S\n-th, for 
the Administration, for the party which had disturbed the har- 
mony which existed between the Xoith and South, to expect. 

The South, right or wrong, it matters not for the purpose of 
the argument, belioved that it was the design of the President 
and of his party to change tlie relations which had till then ex- 
isted between the North and South. If the President and his 
party meant to be understood as having no such design, no such 
intention, how easy would it have been to manifest this feeling 
by offering such constitutional guarantees as were contemplated 
by the Crittenden compromise? This compromise was treated 
by the President and his party with contempt, and their refusal 
to accede to it or to any other system of adjustment which would 
respect the people of the South as an element of American na- 
tionality, compelled the South to believe, and believing to act 
accordingly, that their worst fears of the Administration were 
to be realized, and that the evils they expected to befall them 
consequent upon tlie success of the "Irrepressible Conflict " party, 
were about to be encountered in their most apprehended aspe^it! 
Without following the course of events any further, let us 



10 

come to tlie present condition of tlie coimtiy and to existing 
relations between tlie Kortli and Sonth ; or if the reader prefers 
to so consider it, between tlie Federal Government and tlie 
rebels. Tlie rebellion is as formidable, if not more so, as it lias 
been since tlie firing on Fort Snmter. The Federal Government 
ia no better able than it has been to pnt it down by force of 
arms. Admitting, what it is difiicult for anj one of ordinary- 
perception to do, that the Administration or the Administration 
party desire or design to restore the seceded stcites to the Union, 
what can any one think of the means by which it is sought to 
effect this object. Force is nsed to compel compliance with or 
obedience to the authority which exercises it. JS^ow what is it 
to wliich the Administration or the Administration party desires 
the South to comply ? Yv^hat is it to which the obedience of the 
Sonth is required ? Is it to the Constitution of the United States ? 
It surely cannot be, since every provision of that compact which 
recognizes the rights of persons and of States in their relations 
to the Federal Government, has been violated by the Adminis- 
tration, with the acquiesceuce and approval, and to a great ex- 
tent, under the influence of the Administration party, including 
now, not only Abolitionists and Republicans, but hireling Dem- 
ocrats. What then is it to which the South is expected to com- 
ply ; to what authority is it expected of it that it should be 
obedient? Why, simply to the will of its known enemies; to 
a usurped authority which has no more legitimacy for its uncon- 
stitutional acts than has the de- facto government of the rebels 
for its existence. 

Here, then, is the position, the relation towards the govern- 
ment and to the North, in which the South stands now. Sub- 
jugated it might be by force, but united with tlie North it never 
w^ill be, it never can bo, by the sw^ord. The South is a de facto 
existence in its relations to all the world ; a da jure existence in 
the relations of the Confederate Government to the people of 
the South. The Confederate Government has been invested 
with authority by the people of the South, and this authority is 
obeyed as implicitly and as cheerfully by those people as any 
goverumeiit on earth is respected and obeyed by its citizens or 
Subjects. This being the case, the South must be treated as a 



11 

unit in any effort to restore tlie Union, or to reconstruct one on 
the same geographical basis on which the old Union existed. 
No matter in what light the Confederate Government may be 
regarded by the Federal Government, or by the people of the 
Northern States, that government holds precisely the same 
relations to the people of the South that the Federal Govern- 
ment holds to its citizens who give it their allegiance. In treat- 
ing with the South, therefore, for a restoration of the Union, or 
for its reconstruction, the way to do it successfully, and the only 
way, is to consider and respect the South as an equal in the 
negotiation for that purpose. Tliis cannot be done by the 
sword, by war ; for the object of using the sword is to conquer, 
and to subdue, and compel the compliance of the people 
attacked to the rule or dominion of those who use that means to 
eft'ect their object; and the very fact that such means is resorted 
to is an evidence that the party who does so feels himself the 
superior in authority and power to the party whose obedience is 
sought to be constrained. This the South will not admit in its 
relations to the Federal Government. One government, no 
matter how comparatively few the people may be who acknow- 
ledge its authority, or comparatively limited in extent may be 
its domini'on, is the equal in sovereignty with the government 
of the most populous nation on the globe. Kussia, with its 
many millions of population and its vast geographical extent, is 
no more than the equal in sovereignty with France, Spain, 
Portugal, or the minor kingdoms of Europe ; and hence it is 
that one nation treats with another as a unit and as an equal, 
just like two natural persons do who undertake to make a 
bargain. 

If the Administration, if the people of the North, be really in 
earnest in effecting a restoration of the South to the Union, or 
in forming a new Union on such terms as will be mutually satis- 
factory and mutually beneficial to both sections, the way to 
bring it to a successful consummation, is to make a proposition 
to the South for a convention in which the Federal and Con- 
federate governments shall be equally represented, the object 
being to restore the people of both federations to one govern- 
ment. This the South will agree to, provided its rights and 



12 

interests can be secured and protected as tliej once were under 
the Federal Government. 

To this suggestion it will be objected by both fanatics and 
others interested in the prosecution of the war, that any propo- 
sition, looking to the restoration of peace and to the adjustment 
of questions at issue between the North and South, should come 
from the South, assuming that section of the Union to be both 
the weaker party, the more in the wrong, and the party which 
is most affected injuriously by the existing state of things. All 
this is a mere assumption on the part of the North, which the 
South will not admit. But if it were even all true that the South 
is the weaker party, that it is the party in the wrong, and that it 
is more for its benefit than it is for the North to have an end of 
the war, and to have the Union restored, does it follow from all 
this that the North has not interest enough in itself, in the 
future, in the Union, to make a proposition to the South ? 
Admitting the North to be the stronger party, as it claims to 
be, would it not be an act of magnanimity in it to propose 
terms of compromise to its weaker adversary, especially when 
that adversary is a part of itself, nationally ? 

Some will object that it would be dishonorable to the North 
to propose terms of adjustment to the South. How dishonor- 
able, and why ? Are we not fellow-citizens of the people of the 
South, of the same country ; and are they not our brothers by all 
the ties which connect one people to another? And is it dis- 
honorable for one brother, or for a part of a family at enmity 
with the other j^ortion, to make propositions of peace which 
would put an end to their enmity, to the slaughter of war, and 
restore them to their former love for one another. No propo- 
sition could be dishonorable which would end the infernal war 
between the North and South, and which would restore harmony 
between these people. He is little less than a demon, be him 
what he may in other respects, who interposes his influence to 
prevent the cessation of hostilities between the people of the 
North and South. It would be an honorable as well as a mag- 
nanimous act in the North to propose peace to the South, and 
really it is more the interest of the North than it is of the South 
to have peace restored to tiiis country. However it may be 



13 

during the war, wliich, no matter how long it might last, will he 
of short duration compared to the long years to follow after- 
wards, the North will sutfer more in consequence of this war 
than the South, especially if the South should acquire the sepa- 
rate and independent existence for wliich it is so strenuously 
exertino; itself. The South contains in itself elements of wealth 
with wliich the North has no comparison, and as a people, the 
South have that in common among them which will aggregate 
and combine them in one nationality. The South being out of 
the Union, what has the North in common to hold the remain- 
ing States together as a unit ? Nothing. On the coutrarj^, the 
interests of the East and the West are so diverse and even 
antagonistic to each other that these sections will not remain 
united under one government, should the separate existence of 
the South become an established fact. For this reason, there- 
fore, it is the interest of the North, at least as much as it is of 
the South, to have a cessation of hostilities, and to propose such 
terms of adjustment as cannot fail to reunite the South and 
North in one political system. The self-interest of the North, 
as well as its own existence as a unit, is at stake in the pending 
struggle. It can both preserve its political unity and promote 
and secure its prosperity by making such pro2:)ositions to the 
South for a reconstruction of the Union, as should not fail to 
effect that object. 

Peace being restored, and it being agreed by both North and 
South, as it readily will be, that to be one people, one nation, 
it only remains to determine on what terms the North and South 
can be made one. As they exist now, in hostile array towards 
each other, the South claims to be the equal in sovereignty, in 
power, in authority, with the North. The North disputes this 
assumption, and has lost a quarter of a million of men and more 
than a thousand millions of dollars to maintain its side of the ar- 
gument, and to wliat effect ? Better to admit at once the equality 
of the sections in the negotiation for a new settlement between 
them, than to dispute any longer, to so little purpose as has been 
accomplished, about abstractions. Let each section, through 
its representatives, propose the terms on which a new Union 
might be constructed. Regarding each other as equal, there would 



u 

he no cause for tlie indulgence of sueli feelings of superiority on 
one side or of subjection on the other, as might, if indulged in, 
prevent any negotiations for a settlement from being commenced, 
and any desirable result from being accomplished. Treating aa 
equals, neither party would yield anything to the other in dig- 
nity, sovereignty, equality. In the negotiation, the Federa) 
Government and the people of the Korth would be one. 
party and the Confederate Government and the people of the 
Confederate States would be another, both equal in every re- 
spect, and every proposition looking to a satisfactory adjust- 
ment requiring the mutual consent of both. 

By this means, and on these terms, the Union could either be 
restored as it once existed or a new Union could be formed, 
which would embrace in its geographical domain most, if not 
all, the territorial extent of the United States as they existed 
j)revious to the Eebellion ; and the Union which might be 
formed now would be more lasting, because formed on a basis 
of experience as well as of interest, of which the patriots and 
statesmen who formed the old Union had not the advantage. 
Questions of doubt which have arisen from time to time to dis- 
turb the harmony of the old Union might be settled by constitu- 
tional compact in the formation of the new Union; and the 
checks and balances, which were left too much to be wielded by 
the caprice of the hour, might be connected more intimately 
with some dejjartment of the new Government, which should 
have the authority and requisite power to wield them for the 
enforcement of the authority of the Government, and to protect 
the people individualh^, as well as the States, in the enjoyment 
of their respective rights. In referring to checks and balances, 
it might be well to consider whether the restraints placed by 
the Constitution upon the Executive power should not only be 
more explicitly defined, and some means besides that of im- 
peachment provided, to both check the assumption of power by 
the Executive, and, if assumed, to punish the act. Under the 
present Constitution, it is true, that the powers, duties, and au- 
thority of the several branches of the Government are defined 
and prescribed sufficiently clear, and it is contemplated by the 
Constitution itself, that in case of doubt or diflerence of opinion 



15 

between or among the departments of the Government, that the 
Supreme Court shall decide. But it has been experienced that 
the Executive has no respect for the decisions of that tribunal 
when they conflict with the Executive judgment or will ; and 
that instead of conforming to such decisions, the Executive has 
gone on, and not only disregarded the decisions of the justices 
of the Supreme Court, in cases involving tlie rights and liberties 
of individual citizens, but, in several instances, imprisoned the 
judges of courts for having attempted to perform their svcorn 
duties. There is, therefore, no protection from the usurpations 
of power by the Executive under the present Constilu;ion, 
beyond its mere verbal inhibition, which, if disregarded l)y the 
Executive, amounts to no more than a dead letter. 

In any new compact, therefore, which might be formed as the 
basis of the reunion of the people of the United States there 
should be some constitutional authority given to the Supreme 
Court to carry into efiect its decrees, when a conflict would 
arise between that branch of the Government and either of the 
others on the construction of the authority given to them by the 
Constitution, and to protect individuals in the enjoyment of 
their rights when infringed upon b}^ arbitrary power. 

One mode of doing this might be by investing the United 
States courts with the appointment of the marshals, and these 
marshals with authority, under the direction of the courts, to carry 
into effect judicial decisions. The marshals, as appointed under 
the existing system, feel under more obligation to disregard the 
order of the United States courts than they do to comply with 
such orders, when the decisions of the courts conflict with the 
will of the Executive. The defect of our present system is, that 
if the Executive refuse to carry into effect the decisions of 
courts, these decisions are of no effect. A perfect system of 
government would not leave it to the will or caprice of the Ex- 
ecutive to enforce the laws, or to carry into eflect such a con- 
struction of the laws as the courts might determine. If United 
States marshals held their oflice during the pleasure of the 
judges of their respective districts, instead of holding them at 
the will of the President, these ofiicers would be more likely to 
perform their duties in a manner more conformable to the Con- 



16 

stitution, and less repugnant to their fellow-citizens, tlian thej 
do under the existing system, or than they will ever do under 
circumstances involving an issue between the Executive and 
Judiciary. 

The experience of the day shows that power in the control of 
elective rulers is as dangerous to liberty as it is in the hands of 
hereditary monarchs ; and that mere verbal inhibitions or re- 
straints upon the assumption and exercise of power is of no more 
practical eifect than if the Constitution never existed. Hence, 
if the people of the United States would preserve that form of 
government which gives security to liberty and protection in 
its enjoyment, they must devise some means by which the 
restraints upon power shall be enforced, and if an attempt be 
made to break through these restraints, to punish summarily 
and severely whoever commits such a crime against the country 
and the people. 

There is no security in a centralized, consolidated govern- 
ment for individual liberty. Hence the necessity and the utility 
of having power divided between the Government of the Union 
and the Governments of the respective States, and among seve- 
ral departments and different persons. Provision should be 
made in the amended Constitution that in all other relations, 
except such as are absolutely indispensable to the well-being of 
the Union Government, the people should be identiJfied with 
their respective States, and be secured and protected by the 
States in all their rights of life, liberty, and property. This, it is 
true, is the theory of those Governments now, but the practice 
of the Federal Administration does not conform to this theory. 
On the contrary, it violates not only the relations of the people 
towards the States, but its own relations, as established by law, 
towards the Federal Government. 

Mere constitutional compacts will not hold the people to- 
gether, no more than does constitutional restraints prevent the 
assumption and exercise of arbitrary power. Tliere must be 
something more than the Constitution to hold the people to- 
gether as one nation, and there must be something else besides 
the restraints of the present Constitution to prevent Eepublican 
rulers from becoming despots and tyrants. It is not enough for 



17 

the people to say, by a written or printed agreement, " "We will 
unite ourselves together for our mutual good." This may form 
a Union, but it will not preserve it. There must be a power 
to preserve and pei-petuate this Union, and this power must be 
created by the people, and invested by them with sovereign 
authority, but subject to consequences for abuse of power 
which would in all probablity deter any human being who 
might be intrusted with its exercise from transcending the pre- 
scribed limitations of its authority. A great defect of the Execu- 
tive Department of the existing Federal Government is that 
there is too much power vested in one individual, and that there 
is no punishment prescribed by law for the malfeasance in 
office of Executive officers, nor for abuse of power, nor for the 
assumption of power not granted to the Federal Government. 
Under the present Constitution, the President or any of his 
subordinates may, with entire impunity, commit the most fla- 
gitious acts of despotism. There is no law to punish them, 
although there is a Constitution to restrain them. This is an 
anomalous case. It is a general principle that no wrong can be 
committed that there is not a remedy to redress it ; but the Pre- 
sident of the United States may do wrong continually with im- 
punity, and does so without any apprehensions of being sub- 
jected to unpleasant consequences. The Constitution provides 
for his impeachment, but this is like providing for the trial of a 
person after his death. It is of no practical utility. 

The Constitution says to the President, in substance, " You 
shall not assume nor exercise arbitrary power nor any power but 
that which is herein granted, and hereby authorized." But the 
President and other executive officers, civil and military, do, 
nevertheless, assume and exercise those powers ; powers which 
if exercised by foreign monarchs would be called by us Ameri- 
cans, despotic, and if exercised by their subordinates would 
be denounced by us as tyrannic, and there is no practical remedy 
but that of resistance to prevent or oppose this abuse of power. 
Thus are they^^^ people of the United States left as much at the 
mercy of those who choose to become tyrants and despots as are 
the merest serfs li\ang under the most arbitrary and absolute 
despotisms of the Old World. To some extent this is a defect 

2 



18 

of the Constitution, but to a greater extent it is owing to the 
acquiescence of the people in the exercise of arbitrary power bj 
their public servants. 

The power reseiwed by the Constitution to the States and peo- 
ple, should be so vested as that it could be exercised when needed 
to check the assumption of unauthorized power bj the Federal 
Government. It is a defect of our present system of Govern- 
ment, that this reserved power cannot be wielded otherwise than 
by means of the-ballot box, and even this means is now controlled 
and may be still more subjected to the will of the despots at 
"Washington, who have arrogated to themselves extraordinary 
power. The State Governments ought to be strengthened with 
more power than they possess, and they ouglit to be invested 
with authority over Federal officials who might be influenced to 
depart, by their acts, from the line of duty prescribed by the 
Constitution and laws. 

So should the construction of the Federal Government itself be 
remodelled so as to divide the powers of the Executive between 
two persons at least, and give each section of the Union a repre- 
sentation in the Executive Department of the government, as 
well as in the two other departments. It might be so provided, 
constitutionally, that both the President and Yice President 
should not be elected from the same section of the Union, the sec- 
tions being understood to mean the non-slaveholding States on one 
side, and the slaveholding States on the other. That while the 
appointing power should remain, as it is now, in the President, 
the Yice President should be invested with a veto, as well on 
acts of legislation as on executive acts of the President to such 
an extent, and in such cases as would give security and protec- 
tion to the interests of the section of the Union which the Yice 
President might specially represent. 

The Union, it cannot be denied, is as much a Union or nation 
of sections, as it is of States ; and if there be a propriety, as there 
is, in having States represented in one branch of the Federal 
Government, and the people by districts in two branches of it, 
there is no less propriety and utility in having the distinctive 
sections represented in the Executive Department. To a great 
extent this is done already, by the practice of the executive in 



19 

selecting cabinet officers, and in consnlting with them on the 
administration of the Federal Government. But the President 
is not bound to either consult these officers, or to he advised by 
tlicm, nnich less to be controlled, restrained, or influenced by 
their will or judgment in any way. The executive powers are 
all invested in the President ; and though j)ractically he cannot 
of himself perform all the executive duties, and though the most 
important of these duties are performed by subordinates who 
are not responsible for their acts to either the government, the 
people, the States, or the sections of the Union, these func- 
tionaries are not known to the Constitution, and the Presiucnt 
alone is presumed to be the executive head of the government, 
the others being mere clerks or secretaries of the President, 
without any executive will or judgment but such as the Presi- 
dent chooses to permit them to exercise. To all intents and 
purposes the executive duties are performed by several persons. 
It only needs that the executive powers be divided to conform 
powers and duties to each other, and vest the former by law in 
the same individual who is required to perform the lattei*. 

The reorganization of the executive branch of the Govern- 
ment might restore the Union and preserve it for ages. It can 
never be restored as it was under the Federal Constitution as it 
exists. The Constitution must be changed or the Union wiU 
cease to exist, not only as between the jNorth and the South, 
but as among the States of the North after the South shall be 
either subdued or have acquired a separate existence. The 
interests of the different sections of the Union, the sections of 
the Pacific coast and the great West, as well as of the North and 
South, have become too diverse, and even conflicting with each 
other, to be entrusted to the care of one executive head. These 
sections as much need a representation in the Executive De- 
partment of the government, with Constitutional authority and 
power to protect their respective interests, as such a representa- 
tion is necessary to their well being both in Congress and in the 
Supreme Court. To effect this object, besides providing that 
the President and Yice President should not be elected from the 
same section of the Union, as distinguished by slavcholding and 
non-slaveholding States, the new Constitution might provide 



20 

that the Union he divided into sections or di\-isions, correspond- 
ing in number, either with identity of local interests among con- 
tiguous States, or with the number of necessary heads of executive 
departments. Each of these sections embracing as many contigu- 
ous States as may have local interests in common, and distinctive 
from the other States, should be invested with the right to elect 
one of the heads of Executive Departments ; and it might be so 
provided that after the first election, each section or division of 
States should take its turn in electing the head of a specified 
Executive Department. By this means, every distinct section 
of the Union would be represented constitutionally in the Execu- 
tive branch of the government, and every section would in its 
turn elect the head of each department. 

It will be objected to this proposition, that such a division of 
executive power would weaken that branch of the government ; 
but a careful consideration of the construction of the most 
powerful governments will show that there is no force in the 
objection. Practically, as we have noticed already, the execu- 
tive powers of oar own government are divided among several 
persons, and the executive duties performed by heads of depart- 
ments. It is so also in Great Britain, where, although the 
Queen is the nominal executive, the executive powers are really 
divided among several ministers of state, who are required to 
act in harmony in the performance of executive acts of govern- 
ment. It is not the Queen even who makes appointments to 
ofiice, but the chief ministers of the crown. The objection, 
therefore, without going any further for proofs, that the Execu- 
tive branch of the government would be rendered inefiicient, or 
weakened by dividing the executive power among several per- 
sons, has no great force. The proposed change of the Consti- 
tution would be little more than conforming the theory of the 
fundamental law to the practice of most governments including 
our own, and adopting as a principle in the fundamental law a 
system which has been found to be both useful and necessary 
in practice, and which, if recognized as a principle, might be the 
means of preserving unity of government among the American 
States. 

Our Government system was designed to be one of checks 



21 

and balances, so constructed that while every function of Go- 
Ternment could be performed by either the Federal or State 
Governments, no function of Government should be exercised 
to the prejudice of even one individual, much less of whole 
communities and of States. But it was impossible for mere 
human foresight to perceive that such a combination of circum- 
stances would occur as to be beyond the control of the Constitu- 
tion by which the Federal Government was established. ISTo mere 
human conception, inspired as it may be by patriotism and en- 
lightened by statesmanship, could have thought that within a cen- 
tury after the American people had acquired independence as a 
nation, and liberty as individuals, they would succumb to a 
domestic despotism and tyranny a thousand times more grievous 
in its effects than that which they had thrown ofi" by the vio- 
lence and sacrifices of war. "Nor could it enter into the minds 
of our patriotic ancestors that the example of heroic virtue set 
by the first President of the Kepublic would so soon be brought 
into contrast with the repulsive vices of one of his not very 
remote successors. It is true that history had presented similar 
contrasts, but it was under difi'erent circumstances. As there 
was no parallel to that of the colonists in acquiring independ- 
ence as a people, and establishing for themselves and their pos- 
terity the most perfect system of government the world had 
ever experienced, it never entered into their conceptions that 
their posterity would become so degenerate and debased as to 
sufier this perfection of government to be subverted by those 
who might in time to come be chosen to be its administrators. 
Xo pro^-ision was made by them for such a contingency, and, in 
this respect the system of government is defective, but it is 
owing more to the depravity of both the people and their rulers, 
than it is to any very radical defect of the system itself, that 
our government has proved a failure. But as experience has 
impressively and dearly taught the American people, that men 
void of moral principle, may be elevated from among them to 
the highest places of trust, honor and power, and that these bad 
men may in the exercise of power subvert the very institutions 
of government they were elected to preserve, protect and de- 
fend ; and as they know also by the same experience that self- 



22 

interest will influence many persons to favor the most flagitious 
acts of despotism and tyranny, it becomes tlieir Lonnden dut)^, 
"while Ihere remains any vitality in the Eepuhlic, and patriotism 
among tlie people, to make an earnest eflbrt to preserve even a 
portion of constitutional law as a principle of government, to se- 
cure even a remnant of personal rights, to establish as inviolable 
principles, that violators of law in high places as Avell as among 
the commonality, shall be held amenable for their crimes, and 
that it is a crime second only to treason and be made punishable 
as such, for any ofBcer of the government to violate the Constitu- 
tion, or the rights of persons recognized to be sacred in the peo- 
ple by that compact. 

By such modifications in the fundamental law as are herein 
proposed and by others which experience will suggest to be use- 
ful, a re-union of the States can. be eftected, the blessings of a 
republican form of government and a constitutional system of 
government will be secured to the American people, and the 
personal rights and individual liberty which it was the endeavor 
of our patriot ancestors to purchase for posterity by their lives 
and nurture by their heroic toils and sacrifices, will be protected 
in their fullest enjoyment, and once more we shall have a union 
of States without conflicting sections, a government of authority 
without despotic power, a country which every American can 
proudly call his own. 

It is a principle as sound as Truth, and as applicable to one 
section of the Union as it is to another, that the Union cannot 
be sundered and national life exist in each of its severed parts. 
It must be preserved in one to secure to the people of the North 
at least, the rights of liberty. If left to perish, American na- 
tionality will become extinct forever except as it might exist in 
the slaveholding States; and the securit}^ of individual rights and 
protection in their enjoyment will depend upon the limited power 
of States, which will become weak the moment they become 
sundered from one another. The States will become antagonists 
for supremacy the moment their unity is broken. States Rights 
in the Federal Union is the equilibrium between the rights of 
the people and the powers of the General Government ; but with- 
out the Union, States cannot preserve their Sovereignty nor se- 



23 

cure the people in the enjoyment of their rights of person and 
property. The Union is strong in proportion to the perfection 
of Sovereignty in the States joined together in Union, so will the 
States become weak, and in all probability their Sovereignty be- 
come extinct, shonld the Union be dissolved. Let it therefore 
be the endeavor of the American people to preserve the Sove- 
reignty of the respective States, and the Union of these States 
nnder one government, whose power will be co-omnipotent with 
its duty, and whose duty it will be to give security and pro- 
tection to both States and people in the exercise of their rights 
and functions, and not to become an instrument of desj^otisra 
and tyranny in the hands of ambitious or partisan rulers. With 
such a government the American people will be able to enjoy 
the gifts of Providence bestowed upon them in a vast extent of 
country, in the richness and variety of the productions of its 
soil, in its incalculable wealth of minerals, and in the salubrity 
of its climate. Without such a government America will be- 
come what Asia is, wealthy in everything but in freemen to 
enjoy, as man should, the blessings of Providence. 



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